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Post-quantum cryptosystems have currently seen a surge in inter-
est thanks to the current standardization initiative by the U.S.A.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). A com-
mon primitive in post-quantum cryptosystems, in particular in
code-based ones, is the computation of the inverse of a binary
polynomial in a binary polynomial ring. In this work, we analyze,
realize in software, and benchmark a broad spectrum of binary
polynomial inversion algorithms, targeting operand sizes which
are relevant for the current second round candidates in the NIST
standardization process. We evaluate advantages and shortcomings
of the different inversion algorithms, including their capability to
run in constant-time, thus preventing timing side-channel attacks.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Public key encryption; • Theory of
computation→ Cryptographic primitives.
KEYWORDS
Post-quantumCryptosystems, Code-based Cryptography, Constant-
time Algorithms, Timing Side-channel Attacks.
ACM Reference Format:
Alessandro Barenghi and Gerardo Pelosi. 2020. A Comprehensive Analysis
of Constant-time Polynomial Inversion for Post-quantum Cryptosystems.
In 17th ACM International Conference on Computing Frontiers (CF ’20),May
11–13, 2020, Catania, Italy. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 9 pages. https://doi.
org/10.1145/3387902.3397224
1 INTRODUCTION
The research interest in post-quantum cryptography has been grow-
ing since August 2015 when the U.S.A. National Security Agency
published an online note1 announcing preliminary plans for transi-
tioning from factoring- and discrete logarithm-based cryptographic
algorithms to quantum-computing resistant ones. The popularity
of the topic further increased in December 2016 with the U.S.A.
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National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announcing
an international call for proposals for post-quantum cryptographic
algorithms2. The proposals currently selected for the second round
of the contest encompass a large part of the state-of-the-art in com-
putational techniques such as algorithms in algebraic geometry,
coding theory, and lattice theory. An essential requirement for the
proposals that will be recommended in the future portfolio of post-
quantum cryptographic primitives is to provide efficient software
implementations optimized for x86_64 architectures, with the NIST
specifying Intel Haswell as its primary benchmark target.
Code based cryptosystems have a remarkably good security
track; however, such strength comes at the disadvantage of quite
large public key sizes (in the megabyte range). A promising av-
enue to reduce the key size, is to employ code families admitting
a space-efficient representation, such as quasi-cyclic moderate-
density parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes. Quasi-cyclic codes are
characterized by quasi-cyclic generator and parity check matrices,
i.e., they are composed by circulant, square sub-matrices, where
all the rows are obtained by cyclically shifting the first one. The
arithmetics of such matrices with size p is isomorphic to the one
of the polynomials modulo xp − 1 over the same field as the co-
efficients of the circulant matrices. In particular, in the case of
binary linear block codes, the arithmetics of p×p circulant matrices
over Z2 can be substituted with the arithmetics of polynomials in
Z2[x]/(xp − 1). This, in turn, implies a reduced size of the keypairs
and faster arithmetic operations.
Contributions.We analyze four efficient algorithms for polyno-
mial inversion over Z2[x]/(xp − 1), which represents the most time
consuming operation in the key-generation of LEDAcrypt [1–4], a
current second round candidate to the U.S.A. NIST standardization
effort. We describe in detail the state-of-the-art of the inversion
techniques relying on Euclid’s algorithm, highlighting the non
straightforward similarities between the approaches, and provid-
ing a detailed version of the strategy introduced in [5], tailored to
inverses over Z2[x]/(xp − 1). We also tailor the approach based on
Fermat’s little theorem, describing an optimal square and multiply
chain to compute the required exponentiation. We benchmark our
implementation of all four algorithms, employing the features of-
fered by the extensions of the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)
available in Intel Haswell CPUs, and validate the constant time
nature of the algorithms which are expected to enjoy this property.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2, we provide an overview
of the LEDAcrypt primitives and introduce the schoolbook Eu-
clid’s algorithm for the computation of polynomial multiplicative
2www.nist.gov/pqcrypto
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inverses. In Section 3, we present our systematization of the opti-
mized algorithms to compute polynomial multiplicative inverses
reporting a description of the approaches employed by Brunner et
al. [7], Kobayashi et al. [11] and Bernstein et al. [5]. The section
ends with the presentation of our approach to optimize the inver-
sion algorithm based on the Fermat’s Little Theorem. In Section 4
we report the implementation details of the presented algorithms
to end of comparing both their performance and their behavior
w.r.t. the information leakage (possibly) arising from the timing
side channel. Finally, Section 5 reports our concluding remarks.
2 PRELIMINARIES
The current LEDAcrypt specification [3] describes an IND-CPA and
an IND-CCA2 Key Encapsulation Methods (KEMs) relying on the
Niederreiter cryptoscheme [13], named LEDAcrypt-KEM-CPA and
LEDAcrypt-KEM, respectively. Moreover, a Public Key Encryption
(PKC) system, named LEDAcrypt-PKC, relying on the McEliece
cryptoscheme [12] plus the IND-CCA2 Kobara-Imai γ -construction
is reported as well. The three systems employ a binary QC-MDPC
code having a systematic public parity-check matrix representa-
tion. The Key-Generation algorithms of all mentioned primi-
tives consider a QC-MDPC error corection code C(n,k), with code-
word length n=pn0 and information word length k=p(n0−1), where
n0∈{2, 3, 4}, p is a large prime number such that ordp (2) = p − 1
(i.e., 2 is a primitive element of the Galois field GF(p) Z/pZ). The
private key is composed by the quasi-cyclic p×pn0 parity-check
matrix of the code C(n,k), i.e.: sk={H }, which is in turn structured
as 1×n0 circulant blocks, each of which with size p×p and with v
non-null elements per row/column, where v is an odd number to
guarantee full-rank blocks: H=[H0,H1, . . . ,Hn0−1]. The matrix H
is generated ensuring that each one of the full-rank n0 circulant
blocks H=[H0,H1, . . . ,Hn0−1] has a number of asserted bits in the
first row equal tov (n0 ·v ≈ √pn0). Subsequently, starting from the
multiplicative inverse of Hn0−1, the public key pk of the KEM prim-
itive is obtained as:M = H−1n0−1H =
[
M0 |M1 | . . . |Mn0−2 |I
]
, where
I is a p×p identity matrix. The public key of the LEDAcrypt-PKC is
obtained by convertingM into the corresponding systematic gen-
erator matrix of the same code as pk =
[
D | [M0 | . . . | Mn0−2]T
]
,
where D is a block matrix with n0−1 replicas of I on its diagonal.
2.1 Polynomial Multiplicative Inverses
The key-generation algorithm of all LEDAcrypt primitives require
n0 − 2 multiplications between p × p binary blocks, each of which
represented as an invertible polynomial in the ring Z2[x]/(xp − 1)
with an odd and small number of asserted coefficients v ≈ √p/n0.
In particular, the first factor of each multiplication is given by the
multiplicative inverse of the polynomial a(x) ∈ Z2[x]/(xp − 1)
corresponding to the first row of the last circulant-block of the
secret parity-check matrix H=[H0,H1, . . . ,Hn0−1].
Although the computation of a multiplicative inverse polynomial
is required only once during the execution of the Key-Generation
algorithm for the IND-CCA2 LEDAcrypt-KEM and the IND-CCA2
LEDAcrypt-PKC system, the length/degree of the involved operand
a(x), 7·103<deg(a(x))<9·104, requires to implement carefully this
operation by establishing the inversion strategy that fits best the
Algorithm 1: Inversion using the Euclid’s gcd Algorithm
Input: f (x ) irreducible polynomial of GF(2m ),m ≥ 2,
a(x ) invertible element of GF(2m )
Output: V(x ), polynomial such that a(x )−1 ≡ V(x )mod f (x )
1 begin
2 S(x ) ← f (x ), R(x ) ← a(x )
3 V(x ) ← 0, U(x ) ← 1
4 repeat
5 Q(x ) ← ⌊S(x )/R(x )⌋
6 tmp(x ) ← S(x ) − Q(x ) · R(x ), S(x ) ← R(x ), R(x ) ← tmp(x )
7 tmp(x ) ← V(x ) − Q(x ) · U(x ), V(x ) ← U(x ), U(x ) ← tmp(x )
8 until (R(x ) = 0)
9 return V(x )
10 end
length of the involved operand. Furthermore, the LEDAcrypt-KEM-
CPA system generates ephemeral private/public key pairs to trans-
mit a session key at each run, requiring the computation of a mul-
tiplicative inverse polynomial each time. Finally, another feature
steering the choice of the best polynomial inversion algorithm for
a given primitive and operand size is the posssibility to exhibit a
constant-time implementation to prevent timing based side-channel
analyses aimed at the recovering of the secret key sk = {H }.
2.2 SchoolBook Euclid’s Algorithm
The Euclid’s algorithm to compute the greated common divisor,
gcd, between two polynomials is commonly employed to derive a
polynomial time algorithm yielding the multiplicative inverse of an
element in the multiplicative group of a Galois field represented in
polynomial basis, e.g., the multiplicative group of GF(2m ),m ≥ 2
with GF(2m )  Z2[x]/(f (x)), where f (x) is an irreducible polyno-
mial with deg(f (x)) =m.
A schoolbook analysis considers a polynomial a(x) and the ir-
reducible polynomial f (x), employed to represent the field ele-
ments (deg(a(x)) < deg(f (x))), to iteratively apply the equality
gcd(f (x),a(x))= gcd(a(x), f (x)moda(x)) and derive the computa-
tion path leading to the non-null constant term r epresenting the
greatest common divisor d (e.g., d = 1, when Z2[x] is considered).
deg(f (x)) > deg(a(x)) > 0 d=gcd(f (x),a(x))
r0=f (x), r1=a(x) d=gcd(r0(x), r1(x))
r2=r0mod r1, 0≤deg(r2)<deg(r1) d(x)=gcd(r1(x), r2(x))
· · · · · ·
ri=ri−2mod ri−1, 0≤deg(ri )<deg(ri−1) d = gcd(ri−1(x), ri (x))
· · · · · ·
rz=rz−2mod rz−1, rz (x)=0 d=gcd(rz−1(x), 0)=rz−1(x)
for a proper number of iterations, z ≥ 2. A close look to the previous
derivation shows that two series of auxiliary polynomialswi (x) and
ui (x), 0 ≤ i ≤ z−1, can be defined to derive the series of remainders
ri (x) as: ri (x) = ri−2 − qi (x) · ri−1(x) = wi (x) · f (x) + ui (x) ·





, with r0(x) = f (x) and r1(x) = a(x).
Specifically, the computations shown above can be rewritten as
follows.
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deg(f (x)) > deg(a(x)) > 0
r0 = 1 · f (x) + 0 · a(x) = w0(x) · f (x) + u0(x) · a(x)
r1 = 0 · f (x) + 1 · a(x) = w1(x) · f (x) + u1(x) · a(x)
r2 = r0mod r1 =





(w1(x) · f (x) + u1(x) · a(x)) =
= w2(x) · f (x) + u2(x) · a(x)
· · ·
ri = ri−2mod ri−1 = wi (x) · f (x) + ui (x) · a(x)
· · ·
rz−1 = rz−3mod rz−2 = wz−1(x) · f (x) + uz−1(x) · a(x)
rz = rz−2mod rz−1 = 0
Finally, the multiplicative inverse of a(x) is obtained from the equal-
ity d = wz−1(x) · f (x) + uz−1(x) · a(x), by computing:
a(x)−1 ≡
(
d−1 · uz−1(x)mod f (x)
)
.
In the last derivation of remainder polynomials, it is worth noting
thatwi (x) = wi−2(x)−qi (x) ·wi−1(x), and ui (x) = ui−2(x)−qi (x) ·
ui−1(x), withw0(x) = 1, u0(x) = 0 andw1(x) = 0, u1(x) = 1.
Restricting ourselves to the case of binary polynomials, Algo-
rithm 1 shows the pseudo-code for computing an inverse employing
only the strictly needed operations. Note that the execution of an
actual division would prevent the efficient implementation of the
algorithm, therefore in the following section we consider the opti-
mizations to this algorithm that circumvent its computation. The
naming conventions adopted in Algorithm 1 denote as R(x) the i-th
remainder of the gcd procedure described before, and as S(x) the
(i − 1)-th remainder, with i ≥ 1. Furthermore, the i-th u(x) value
is denoted as U(x), while the value it took at the previous iteration
(i.e., the (i − 1)-th u(x) value) is denoted as V(x), with i ≥ 1.
Note that in the last iteration (the z-th one, counting the first as 1)
R(x) = rz (x) = 0, while S(x) = rz−1(x) = 1.
The rationale to keep the notation of the pseudo-code variables
as polynomials in x lies on the willingness of not specifying the
implementation dependent choice for the endianness of values
stored in array variables, i.e., if the least significant coefficient of a
polynomial is stored in the first or last cell of an array.
In the case of LEDAcrypt where the arithmetic operations are
performed in Z2[x]/(xp − 1), with ordp (2) = p − 1, it is worth
noting that the Euclid’s algorithm can still be applied to compute the
inverse of invertible elements as the factorization of f (x) = xp − 1
in irreducible factors, i.e., f (x) = (x + 1) · (∑p−1i=0 x i ), shows that
every binary polinomial a(x) with degree less than p and an odd
number of asserted coefficients, that is also different from the said
factors, (i.e., any polynomial representing a circular block in the
LEDAcrypt) always admits a greater common divisor equal to one
(i.e., gcd(a(x), f (x)) = 1). As a consequence, the steps of the Euclid’s
algorithm to compute inverses remain the same shown before.
3 OPTIMIZED POLYNOMIAL INVERSIONS
In [7] Brunner et al. optimized the computation performed by Al-
gorithm 1 embedding into it the evaluation of the quotient and
remainder of the polynomial division ⌊S(x)/R(x)⌋. Indeed, Algo-
rithm 2 performs the division operation by repeated shifts and
subtractions, while keeping track of the difference δ between the
degrees of polynomials in S(x) (which is the dividend and starts
by containing the highest degree polynomial, that is, the modulus
Algorithm2: Brunner et al. (BCH) InversionAlgorithm [7]
Input: f (x ) irreducible polynomial of GF(2m ),m ≥ 2,
a(x ) invertible element of GF(2m )
Output: V(x ), such that a(x )−1 ≡ V(x ) ∈ GF(2m )
Data: polynomial variables R(x ), S(x ), U(x ), V(x ) are assumed to have at
mostm+1 coefficients each (e.g., R(x )=Rm ·xm+Rm−1 ·xm−1+· · ·
+R1 ·x+R0 , with Ri ∈ Z2, 0 ≤ i ≤ m) to prevent reduction operations
(i.e., mod f (x )) among the intermediate values of the computation;
δ stores a signed integer number
1 begin
2 S(x ) ← f (x ), R(x ) ← a(x )
3 V(x ) ← 0, U(x ) ← 1, δ ← 0
4 for i ← 1 to 2 ·m do
5 if (Rm = 0) then
6 R(x ) ← x · R(x )
7 U(x ) ← x · U(x )
8 δ ← δ + 1
9 else
10 if (Sm = 1) then
11 S(x ) ← S(x ) − R(x )
12 V(x ) ← V(x ) − U(x )
13 else
14 S(x ) ← x · S(x )
15 if (δ = 0) then
16 tmp(x ) ← R(x ), R(x ) ← S(x ), S(x ) ← tmp(x )
17 tmp(x ) ← U(x ), U(x ) ← V(x ), V(x ) ← tmp(x )
18 U(x ) ← x · U(x )
19 δ ← 1
20 else
21 U(x ) ← U(x )/x
22 δ ← δ − 1
23 return V(x )
f (x)) and R(x) (which is the divisor, and is initialized to the polyno-
mial of which the inverse should be computed, a(x)). The difference
between the degrees, δ = deg(S) − deg(R) is updated each time the
degree of either S(x) or R(x) is altered, via shifting.
Brunner et al. in [7] observed that, since either a single bit-
shift or a subtraction is performed at each iteration, the number
of iterations equals 2m, that is the numberm of single bit-shifts
needed to consider every bit of the element to be inverted, plus the
number of substractions to be performed after each alignment. The
last iteration of the Algorithm 2 computes R(x) = 0, S(x) = 1 (i.e.,
deg(R) = deg(S) = 0), and outputs the result in V(x). The part of
Algorithm 2 dealing with computations on U(x) and V(x) mimics
the same operations, in the same order, that are applied to R(x) and
S(x), respectively, as the schoolbook algorithm does (Alg. 1).
3.1 Kobayashi-Takagi-Takagi Algorithm
The target implementation of Algorithm 2 is a dedicated hardware
one, therefore the algorithm simplifies the computations to be per-
formed in it, reducing them to single bit-shifts, bitwise xors and
single bit comparison. While this approach effectively shortens the
combinatorial cones of a hardware circuit, yielding advantages in
timing, when directly transposed in a software implementation it
may fail to exploit the wide computation units that are present in
a CPU to the utmost. In particular, modern desktop, and high-end
mobile CPUs are endowed with a so-called carryless multiplier
computation unit. Such a unit computes the product of two binary
polynomials with degree lower than the architecture word size,
w with a latency which is definitely smaller than computing the
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same operation with repeated shifts and xors (3–7 cycles on Intel
CPUs [9]). To maximize the exploitation of the available carryless
multipliers, Kobayashi et al. [11] optimized further the gcd based
Algorithm 2. The main assumption in this sense is that aw-bit in-
put carryless multiplier is available on the target CPU architecture.
Algorithm 3 reports the result of the optimization proposed in [11],
which still takes as input an irreducible polynomial of GF(2m ), em-
ployed to build a representation for all its elements, and one of
its invertible elements. However, these polynomials and the ones
computed as intermediate values of the algorithm, are now thought
as polynomials of degree at most M − 1, with M = ⌈(m + 1)/w⌉,
having as coefficients binary polynomials with degreew − 1. For
example,the polynomial S(x) = sm ·xm+sm−1 ·xm−1+· · ·+s1 ·x+s0,
with sj ∈ {0, 1} and 0 ≤ j ≤ m, is processed by considering
it as S(x) = SM−1(x) · (xw )M−1 + · · · + S1(x) · (xw )1 + S0(x),
Si (x) = siw+w−1 · xw−1 + · · · + siw+1 · x + siw , where siw+l = 0 if
iw + l > m, with 0 ≤ l ≤ w − 1, and 0 ≤ i ≤ M − 1.
Employing this approach, the loop at lines 5–22 of Algorithm 2
is rewritten to perform fewer iterations, each one of them corre-
sponding to the computation made inw iterations of Algorithm 2.
The crucial observation is that the computations performed by
Algorithm 2 on U(x), V(x), R(x),and S(x) at each iteration can be









. Indeed, the authors represent the computation portions
































rewrite similarly also lines 11–12, line 14, lines 16–18 and line 21.
With this representation of the computation, Algorithm 3 selects
a portion of R(x) and S(x) as large as an architectural word (line
5 of Algorithm 3) and makes a copy of them (variables C(x) and
D(x)). Employing these copies, Algorithm 3 computes a single linear
transformation, H cumulating the effects of w computations of
the main loop of Algorithm 2, to apply them all at once (line 33,
Algorithm 3). While this approach appears more expensive, as
polynomial multiplications are employed to compute the values of
U(x), V(x), R(x),and S(x) at the end of each iteration of the loop at
lines 5–33, we recall that such multiplications can be carried out at
the cost of a handful of xors by the carryless multipliers present on
modern CPUs, effectively resulting in a favourable tradeoff for the
strategy described by Algorithm 3. To provide a further speedup,
Algorithm 3 has a shortcut in case entire word-sized portions of
R(x) (which is initialized with the input polynomial to be inverted)
are filled with zeroes, a fact which can be efficiently checked in
one or a few CPU operations in software. Indeed, in that case, the






therefore the authors of Algorithm 3 insert a shortcut (lines 6–
9) to skip the expensive execution of the loop body computing
a trivial transformation, simply applying the aforementioned H ,
which boils down to two word-sized operand shifts (line 7). We note
that this efficiency improvement trick, while effectively making
the inversion faster, it also provides an information leakage via
the timing side channel. Indeed, due to this shortcut, the inversion
Algorithm3:Kobayashi et al. (KTT) InversionAlgorithm [11]
Input: f (x ) irreducible polynomial of GF(2m ),m ≥ 2,
a(x ) invertible element of GF(2m )
Output: V(x ), such that a(x )−1 ≡ V(x ) ∈ GF(2m )
Data: Polynomials R(x ), S(x ), U(x ), V(x ) have at mostm+1 binary
coefficients to prevent the execution of modulo operations in the
intermediate computations. Furthermore, they are assumed to be
processed aw -bit chunk at a time, i.e., M = ⌈(m + 1)/w ⌉ and
R(x )=RM−1(x )·(xw )M−1+· · ·+R1(x )·(xw )1+R0(x ), with
0 ≤ deg(Ri (x )) < w , 0 ≤ i ≤ M − 1;
Polynomials C(x ) and D(x ) are such that 0 ≤ deg(C), deg(D) < w .
1 begin
2 S(x ) ← f (x ), R(x ) ← a(x )
3 V(x ) ← 0, U(x ) ← x , degR← M ·w−1, degS← M ·w−1
4 while degR > 0 do
5 C(x ) ← RM−1(x ), D(x ) ← SM−1(x )
6 if C(x ) = 0 then
7 R(x ) ← xw · R(x ), U(x ) ← xw · U(x )
8 degR← degS −w






, j ← 1
11 while j < w and degR > 0 do
12 j ← j + 1






















16 degR← degR − 1
17 else if (degR = degS) then
18 degR← degR − 1













































26 degS← degS − 1
































































34 if deg(R) = 0 then
35 return U(x )/xwM
36 return V(x )/xwM
algorithm will be running faster if it is consuming words of the
polynomial to be inverted which contain only zeroes. As a result,
some information on the length of the zero runs of the operand
is encoded in the timing side channel. We note that, many code-
based cryptoschemes, the position of the asserted coefficients of the
polynomial to be inverted represent the private key of the scheme.
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As a final step, Algorithm 3 returns either the value of U(x) or the
value of V(x), detecting which is the variable containing the actual
pseudo inverse (i.e., a(x)−1xwM ), and performing an exact division
by xwM (i.e., a shift byM words).
3.2 Bernstein-Yang Algorithm
The last approach to polynomial inversion via improved Euclid
algorithms, is the one recently proposed in [5]. Bernstein et al. pro-
vide a comprehensive study [5] of modular inversion and greatest
common divisor (gcd) computation both for integer and polynomial
Euclidean domains. In this work, we specialize the divide-et-impera
strategy devised for the computation of gcds and modular inverses
for polynomial rings having coefficients over a generic GF(p) onto
one which only performs the computation of modular inverses
of binary polynomials. We report the said specialized algorithm
as Algorithm 4. A full proof of the correctness of the algorithmic
approach is provided in [5], and we will omit it from the current
work for space reasons. However, to provide an intuition of the
inner working of Algorithm 4, we note that it is possible to obtain
Algorithm 3 as a special case of it,highlighting the conceptual sim-
ilarities. The key observation made in [5] is that it is possible to
split the operands recursively up to a point where the operands
become as small as the designer deems useful (a machine word,
in our case) and then proceed to compute a portion of the linear
transform over GF(2m ) which operates on the inputs to provide
the modular inverse. Once such a transform is computed for the
operand fragments, the transform can be recombined by means
of a multiplication of matrices over GF(2m ) yielding the modular
inverse. Algorithm 4 performs the operand splitting phase in the
jumpdivstep function (defined at lines 17–25), taking two polyno-
mials f (x),д(x) of maximum degree n and the difference between
their degrees δ , and picking a splitting point j (line 20). The splitting
point can be chosen as any non null portion of the maximum degree
n, although splitting the operands in half is likely to be optimal. We
report that the intuition of optimality of splitting the operands in
half was verified to be the optimal choice in our implementations.
Two subsequent recursive calls to the jumpdivstep function are
made, splitting the input polynomials at their j-th degree term (lines
21 and 34), until the maximum degree n is equal or smaller than
the machine word size (w in the algorithm). When this happens
(“branch taken” at line 18 of Algorithm 4), the function handling
the base case of the recursion, divstep is invoked. divstep can be
seen as a clever reformulation of n iterations, of the loop body of
Algorithm 2, with n being the parameter taken as input by divstep.
The computation of the loop body is decomposed into a conditional
swap (lines 5–9), depending only on the value of the difference
between the operand degrees δ being positive and the constant
term of д(x) being equal to 1, and a sequence of steps (lines 10–13)
performing the correct operation between the two portions of the
source operands f (x),д(x) and the auxiliary values.
This approach allows a constant-time implementation using for
the if construct Boolean-predicate operations (lines 5–9).
To compute the polynomial inverse, Algorithm 4 invokes the
jumpdivstep function on the reflected representation of both the
modulus and the polynomial to be inverted, that is it considers the
polynomials S, R of the same degree of f (x) and a(x), respectively,
Algorithm4: Bernstein et al. (BY) Inverse [5] specialized for GF(2m )
Input: f (x ) irreducible polynomial of GF(2m ),m ≥ 2,
a(x ) invertible element of GF(2m )
Output: V(x ), such that a(x )−1 ≡ V(x ) ∈ GF(2m )
Data:w : machine word size
// Base case, solved iteratively on n ≤ w
1 function divstep(n, δ , f (x ), д(x )):
2 U(x ) ← xn−1; V(x ) ← 0
3 Q(x ) ← 0; R(x ) ← xn−1
4 for i← 0 to n − 1 do
5 if (δ > 0 ∧ д0 = 1) then
6 δ ← −δ
7 Swap(f (x ), д(x ))
8 Swap(U(x ), Q(x ))
9 Swap(R(x ), V(x ))
10 δ = δ + 1
11 Q(x ) ← (f0 · Q(x ) − д0 · U(x ))/x // dropping the remainder
12 R(x ) ← (f0 · R(x ) − д0 · V(x ))/x // dropping the remainder
13 д(x ) ← (f0 · д(x ) − д0 · f (x ))/x // dropping the remainder
14 H ←
(
U(x ) V(x )
Q(x ) R(x )
)
15 return δ , H
16
// Splitting case, shortens operands until n ≤ w
17 function jumpdivstep(n, δ , f (x ), д(x )):
18 if n ≤ w then
19 return divstep(n, δ , f (x ), д(x ))
// any j > 0 is admissible, intuitive optimum at ⌊ n2 ⌉
20 j ← ⌊ n2 ⌉ // integer part of n2
21 δ , P ← jumpdivstep(j , δ , f (x ) mod x j , д(x ) mod x j )
22 f ′(x ) ← P0,0 · f (x ) + P0,1 · д(x )
23 д′(x ) ← P1,0 · f (x ) + P1,1 · д(x )





) // dropping remainders
25 return δ , (P × Q)
26
// Main inverse function calling recursion splitting case
27 S(x ) ← mirror(f (x )), R(x ) ← mirror(a(x ))
28 δ , H ← jumpdivstep(2m − 1, 1, S(x ), R(x ))
29 V(x ) ← mirror(H0,1)
30 return V(x )
obtained swapping the coefficient of the x i term with the one of
the xdeg(S)−i (resp., xdeg(S)−i ) one. Both polynomials, represented
as degree 2m − 1 ones, adding the appropriate null terms, are pro-
cessed by the jumpdivstep call, which returns the final difference
in degrees (expected to be null), and the reflected representation of
the polynomial inverse in the second element of the first row ofH .
3.3 Inversion with Fermat’s Little Theorem
Finally, an approach to perform a constant-time implementation
of the binary polynomial inversion is to employ the Fermat’s little
theorem. While this procedure is usually slower on a polynomial
ring with a generic modulus, we obtain an efficient implementa-
tion of Fermat’s method to compute inverses in Z2[x]/(xp − 1),
in case p is prime and ordp (2) = p − 1 (i.e., 2 is a primitive ele-
ment of GF(p)), as it is the case in the LEDAcrypt parameters. In-




where f (i)(x) are the irreducible factors of xm − 1 ∈ Z2[x], each
with its own multiplicity λi ≥ 0. As a consequence, the number
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admitting an inverse is:(Z2[x]/(f (i)(x))λi )∗ = 2deg(f (i ))·λi − 2deg(f (i ))(λi−1), and the mul-
tiplicative inverse of a unitary element in Z2[x]/(xm − 1) can be
obtained by raising it to the least common multiple (lcm) of the
said quantities:
lcm(2deg(f (1))·λ1−2deg(f (1))(λ1−1), 2deg(f (2))·λ2−2deg(f (2))(λ2−1), . . .)−1.
In our case, where m = p and p is a prime number such that
ordp (2)=p−1, the polynomial xp−1 factors as the product (x + 1) ·







= 2p−1−1, while the com-
putation of the inverse of a(x) ∈ ((Z2[x]/(xp − 1)∗, ·) is obtained
raising it to 2p−1 − 2, i.e., a(x)−1 = a(x)2p−1−2.
Noting that the binary representation of 2p−1 − 2 is obtained as
a sequence of p − 2 set bits followed by a null bit (i.e., 2p−1 − 2 =
(11, . . . , 10)bin), a simple (right-to-left) square & multiply strategy
would compute the inverse employing p − 2 modular squarings
and p − 3 multiplications (i.e., a(x)−1 = a(x)2 · a(x)22 · · ·a(x)2p−1 ).
However, as reported first in [8], it is possible to devise a more
efficient square and multiply chain, tailoring it to the specific value
of the exponent. Indeed, we are able to obtain a dedicated algo-
rithm, reported as Algorithm 5, which computes the inversion with
only ⌈log2(p − 2)⌉ + HammingWeigth(p − 2) multiplications and
p − 1 squarings. Since the squaring operations are significantly
more frequent than the multiplications, it is useful to exploit the
fact that polynomial squaring can be computed very efficiently in
Z2[x]/(xp − 1). Indeed, two approaches are possible.
The first approach observes the fact that computing a square of
an element of Z2[x] is equivalent to the interleaving of its (binary)
coefficients with zeroes, an operation which has linear complexity
in the number of polynomial terms (as opposed to the quadratic
complexity of a multiplication).
The second approach builds on the observation made in [10]:
given an element a(x) ∈ Z2[x]/(xp −1), considering the set of expo-
nents of its non-zero coefficient monomials S allows to rewrite a(x)
as
∑
j ∈S x j . It is known that, on characteristic 2 polynomial rings
we have that ∀i ∈ N,
(∑
j ∈S (x j )
)2i ≡ ∑j ∈S (x j )2i , thus allowing us
to obtain the 2i -th power of a(x) by computing the 2i -th powers of a
set of monomials, and then adding them together. To efficiently com-
pute the 2i -th power of a monomial, observe that the order of x in
Z2[x]/(xp −1) is p (indeed, xp −1 ≡ 0 in our ring, therefore xp ≡ 1).
We therefore have that (x j )2i = (x j )2i mod p in Z2[x]/(xp − 1). This
in turn implies that it is possible to compute the 2i -th power of an
element a(x) ∈ Z2[x]/(xp − 1) simply permuting its coefficients
according to the following permutation: the j-th coefficient of the
polynomial a(x), 0≤j≤p−1, becomes the ((j · 2i ) mod p)-th coeffi-
cient of the polynomial a(x)2i . This observation allows to compute
the 2i -th power of an element in Z2[x]/(xp − 1), again, at a linear
cost (indeed, the one of permuting the coefficients); moreover the
permutation which must be computed is fixed, and depends only on
the values p and 2i , which are both public and fixed, thus avoiding
any meaningful information leakage via the timing side channel.
The authors of [10] observe that, since the required permutations,
Algorithm 5: Inverse based on Fermat’s Little Theorem
Input: a(x ): element of Z2[x ]/(xp − 1) with a multiplicative inverse.
Output: c(x ) = (a(x )e )2 , and e=2p−2−1=(11 . . . 1)bin . The binary
encoding of e is a sequence of p−2 set bits.
Data: p : a prime such that ordp (2) = p − 1 (i.e., 2 is a primitive element of
GF(p)).
The algorithm is instrinsically constant-time w.r.t. to the value of a(x ),
as the control flow depends only on the value of p , which is not a
secret.
Computational cost: ⌈log2(p − 2)⌉ − 1 + HammingWeight(p − 2)
polynomial multiplications, plus p − 1 squarings
1 exp← BinEncoding(p − 2)
2 expLength←⌈log2(p − 2)⌉
// scan of exp from right to left; i=0↔ LSB
3 b(x ) ← a(x ) // exp0=1 as p−2 is an odd number
4 c(x ) ← a(x )
5 for i ← 1 to expLength − 1 do
6 c(x ) ← c(x )22
i−1
· c(x ) // 2i−1 squarings, 1 mul.
7 if expi = 1 then
8 b(x ) ← b(x )22
i
// 2i squarings
9 b(x ) ← b(x ) · c(x ) // 1 multiplication
10 c(x ) ← (b(x ))2 // 1 squaring
11 return c(x )
one for each value of (2i mod p), with i ∈ {1, . . . , ⌈log2(p − 2)⌉}
are fixed, they can be precomputed, and stored in lookup tables.
We note that the precomputation of such tables, while feasible,
is likely to take a non-negligible amount of memory. Indeed, such
tables requirep ·(⌈log2(p−2)⌉−1)· ⌈log2(p)⌉ bits to be stored, assum-
ing optimal packing in memory. This translates into tables ranging
between 136 kiB and 2, 856 kiB for the recommended prime sizes
in LEDAcrypt [3]. While these table sizes are not problematic for
an implementation targeting a desktop platform, more constrained
execution environments, such as microcontrollers, may not have
enough memory to store the full tables.
To this end, we introduce and examine a computational tradeoff,
where only a small lookup table comprising the (⌈log2(p − 2)⌉ − 1)
values obtained as (2i mod p), with i ∈ {1, . . . , ⌈log2(p − 2)⌉}, is
precomputed and stored, while the position of the j-th coefficient,
0≤j≤p−1, of a(x)2i is computed via a multiplication and a (single-
precision) modulus operation online, as (j · (2i mod p)) mod p.
This effectively reduces the tables to a size equal to (⌈log2(p −
2)⌉ − 1) · ⌈log2(p)⌉ bits, which corresponds to less than 1 kiB for all
the LEDAcrypt parameters.
Finally, the authors of [10] also note that, on x86_64 platforms, it
is faster to precompute the inverse permutation with respect to the
one corresponding to raising a(x) to 2i , as it allows the collection of
binary coefficients of the result a(x)2i that are contiguous in their
memory representation. This is done determining, for each coeffi-
cient of a(x)2i , which was its corresponding one in a(x) through
the inverse permutation. The said inverse permutation maps the
coefficient of the l-th degree term in a(x)2i , 0≤l≤p−1, back to the
coefficient of the (l · (2−i mod p) mod p)-th term in a(x). We note
that, also in this case, it is possible to either tabulate the entire
set of inverse permutations, as suggested by [10], or simply tabu-
late the values of (2−i mod p) and determine each position of the
permutation at hand partially online.
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(a) Running time of the different algorithms
















(b) Value of the t statistic computed on 10k samples
Figure 1: Experimental evaluation of the four modular inverse algorithms. (a) average running time in clock cycles over 103
computations. (b) absolute value of the t-statistic for a Student’s t with two populations of 103 execution times for each algo-
rithm. The dashed horizontal line highlights the upper bound of the range [−4.5, 4.5], pointing out no data-dependent changes
in the timing behaviors of the algorithms below it with a confidence of 99.999% (α = 10−5)
4 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We realized a self-contained implementation in C11 of all the afore-
mentioned inversion algorithms, employing appropriate compiler
intrinsics to exploit the features of the AVX2 ISA extensions avail-
able on the Intel Haswell microarchitecture, selected by the U.S.A.
National Institute of Standards and Technology as the standard
evaluation platform (source code available at https://doi.org/10.
5281/zenodo.3760589). In particular, we employed vector Boolean
instructions to speed up the required xor and shift operations
which make up a significant portion of the reported algorithms.
We exploited the presence of the carryless multiplication instruc-
tion (pclmulqdq) which performs a polynomial multiplication of
two 64-bit elements in a 128-bit one. We implemented the polyno-
mial multiplication primitive applying the Toom-Cook (TC) opti-
mized interpolation proposed in [6] until the recursive operand-
splitting computation path yields operands below 50, 64-bit machine
words. Then we employ a Karatsuba multiplication technique, with
all multiplications involving operands below 9 machine words per-
formed picking the optimal sequence of additions & multiplications
according to [15]. We determined the number of machine words
where the multiplication strategy changes (between the TC and
Karatsuba ones) via exhaustive exploration of the tradeoff points.
Concerning the exponentiations to 2i , as required by the op-
timized Fermat’s little based inverse, we investigated the effects
of the tradeoff reported in [10], where it is noted that, for small
values of i , it can be faster to compute the exponentiation to 2i
by repeated squaring, instead of resorting to a bitwise permuta-
tion. Indeed, it is possible to obtain a fast squaring exploiting the
pclmulqdq instruction which performs a binary polynomial multi-
plication of two, 64 terms, polynomials in a 128 terms one. While it
may appear counterintuitive, this approach is faster than the use
of the dedicated Parallel Bits Deposit (pdep) instruction available
in the AVX2 instruction set. Indeed, the throughput obtained with
the parallel bit deposit instruction is lower than the one obtained
via pclmulqdq. This is due to the possibility of performing two
pclmulqdq bit-interleaving starting from a 128-bit operand which
can be loaded in a single instruction, as opposed to two pdep which
need to expand a 64-bit wide operand only. This fact, combined
with the low latency of the pclmulqdq instruction (5 to 7 cycles,
depending on the microarchitecture, with a CPI of 1, while the pdep
instruction has a 3 cycles latency, to acts on operands having half
the size) provides a fast zero interleaving strategy. We also recall
that, the implementation of the pdep instruction on AMD CPUs is
quite slow (50+ cycles), and non constant-time, as it is implemented
in microcode. As a consequence, the use of the pdep instruction
would lead to a scenario where the non constant-time execution on
a (AVX2 ISA extension compliant) AMD CPU can compromise the
security of the implementation. Finally, we note that the pclmulqdq
bit-interleaving strategy performs better than the one relying on
interleaving by Morton numbers [14], employing the 256-bit regis-
ters available via the AVX2 ISA extension, plus the corresponding
vector shift and or instructions.
We ran our experimental campaign on two AMD64machines, an
Intel Core i5-6600, and an AMD Ryzen 5 1600, both running Debian
GNU/Linux 10, compiling the implementations with GCC ver. 8.3.0,
enabling the architecture-specific code emission (-march=native
compilation option) and the maximum optimization level (-O3 op-
tion). We measured the running time of our implementations em-
ploying the rtdscp instruction available in the AMD64 ISA to
obtain the number of clock cycles taken by a run of each algorithm,
taking care of pre-heating the instruction cache running another
non-timed execution of the same algorithm before. To obtain prac-
tical results, we computed the polynomial inversions picking the
modulus f (x)=xp−1∈GF(2p )[x] for all the values of p indicated
in the LEDAcrypt specification [3] for use in the ephemeral key
exchange LEDAcrypt-KEM-CPA, and in the IND-CCA2 LEDAcrypt-
KEM with their two-iterations out-of-place decoder. Figure 1 (a)
provides a depiction of the average number of clock cycles taken to
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compute each polynomial inversion algorithm, computed over 103
runs of it, acting on a randomly drawn, invertible, polynomial on
the Intel based machine. As it can be seen, the inverse computation
strategy exploiting large tables and Fermat’s little theorem proves
to be the most efficient one for the entire range of primes which
are employed in the LEDAcrypt specification. Analogous results
were obtained on the AMD based machine, and are omitted for the
sake of brevity. A further noteworthy point is that, if a compact
memory footprint is desired, and the constant-time property is not
strictly required, as it is the case for ephemeral keypairs, Algo-
rithm 3 (KTT) provides a valid alternative to the method relying on
Fermat’s little theorem, with compact lookup tables (Fermat-comp
in the legend) for the low range of prime sizes. We also note that an
implementation of Fermat’s little polynomial inverse, employing
only repeated squarings via bit interleaving, instead of a permuta-
tion based computation of the exponentiation to 2i is significantly
slower (Fermat-sq in Figure 1) than all other methods. Finally, we
note that, if the modular inverse is not being computed on a poly-
nomial ring having a modulus with a peculiar structure, such as
Z2[x]/(xp − 1), the benefits of performing the inversion via Fer-
mat’s little theorem may be smaller, or nullified, with respect to a
completely general purpose inversion algorithm such as the one by
Bernstein and Yang, which, from our analysis provides competitive
performance and is constant time.
We note that the implementation of the algorithms expected to
be running in constant time (Algorithm 4 (BY in the legend) and Al-
gorithm 5 (Fermat-sq, Fermat-comp, and Fermat-tab in the legend))
relies on their implementation not containing any secret-dependent
branches, nor any memory lookups whose address depends on a
secret value. To provide an experimental validation of the said fact
Figure 1 (b) reports the result of the validation of the constant-time
property by means of a Student t-test, for each value of p, done on
two timing populations of 103 samples each taken, one when com-
puting inverses of random invertible polynomials, and the other
when computing the inverse of the x2 +x + 1 trinomial. The choice
of a trinomial is intended to elicit the leakage of the position of the
(very sparse) set coefficients, which represents the secret not to be
disclosed in cryptoschemes such as LEDAcrypt, as the position of
the few set coefficients is clustered at one end of the polynomial.
The values of the t-statistic, represented in absolute value in
Figure 1 (b), for Algorithm 4 (BY in the legend) and Algorithm 5
(All Fermat variants in the legend) are within the range [−4.5, 4.5]
(dashed horizontal lines), in turn implying that the t-test is not
detecting data-dependent changes in the timing behaviors with a
confidence of 99.999% (α = 10−5). By contrast both the method by
Brunner et al. (BCH in the legend), and the method by Kobayashi et
al. (KTT in the legend) show t statistic values far out of the interval
[−4.5, 4.5], exposing (as expected) their non constant time nature.
Finally, we note that on a desktop platform, given a polynomial
to be inverted a(x), making the KTT and BCH algorithms immune
to the timing side channel by replacing the computation of a(x)−1
with λ(x)·(λ(x)·a(x))−1, where λ(x) is a randomly chosen invertible
polynomial, will increase further their performance penalty w.r.t.
the Fermat-tab solution. Indeed, this solution (known as operand
blinding) requires λ(x) to be a large, random polynomial in our
case, since a(x) is highly sparse, and a value of λ(x) having few
coefficients would not hide its structure.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We analyzed, implemented and benchmarked a set of polynomial
inversion algorithms, taking as our case study the binary polyno-
mials over Z2[x]/(xp − 1), which are of interest due to their use
in current post-quantum cryptosystems such as LEDAcrypt. Our
analysis and experimental evaluation shows that, on platforms
providing AVX2 ISA extensions, an optimized implementation of
the Fermat’s Little theorem turns out to be the best performing
strategy overall, in addition to exhibiting a constant-time behavior.
Furthermore, we observe that, even selecting a tradeoff between
computation and memory geared towards a smaller fingerprint, the
aforementioned method is still competitive in performance with
variable time algorithms when the prime p sizes exceed ≈ 30, 000
bits. Finally, we provided the general inversion algorithms intro-
duced in [5] adapted for the case of binary fields and verified its
competitive performance and strong constant-time guarantees.
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